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KATE ANDRIAS

JANUS’S TWO FACES

In ancient Roman religion and myth, Janus is the god of beginnings,
transitions, and endings. He is often depicted as having two faces, one
looking to the future and one to the past. The Supreme Court’s Janus v AFSCME case of last Term is ﬁttingly named.1 Stunning in its
disregard of principles of stare decisis, Janus overruled the forty-yearold precedent Abood v Detroit Board of Education.2 The Janus decision
marks the end of the post–New Deal compromise with respect to public sector unions and the First Amendment. Looking to the future, Janus
lays the groundwork for further attack on labor rights—as well as for a
broader erosion of civil society and democracy at the expense of corporate power. In that way, Janus represents an unequivocal transition to
what Justice Kagan termed a “weaponized” view of the First Amendment among the Court’s majority—indeed, far more so than her dissent elaborates.
But Janus may also have another, more hopeful, forward-looking
face. Ultimately, Janus’s undoing of the compromise that governed
union fees for nearly ﬁfty years provides the opportunity for a sys-
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tematic rethinking of the relationship between labor and the Constitution and, more generally, of the meaning of the First Amendment.
In Janus, the dissenters on the Court gestured at this broader
project, but their future-facing efforts were partial and unsatisfying.
Instead, they looked backward to Abood, a precedent the result of
which was tolerable, but the reasoning of which was deeply ﬂawed.
Abood adopted a categorical approach to compelled subsidization of
speech. It also fundamentally misconstrued the role of unions and
their relationship to politics, the public’s interest in labor relations,
and the nature of the “public square.” In so doing, Abood helped lay
the groundwork for Janus’s demolition of union rights and for its
protection of a right to exit from democratic institutions. Though
stare decisis counseled in favor of maintaining Abood, its demise now
opens up space to begin to ﬂesh out what, in this setting, Justice
Kagan’s promise of a “First Amendment meant for better things”
might look like.3 This essay takes a ﬁrst step toward that end.
I
There is little dispute that the Supreme Court dealt a devastating blow to unions last Term when it issued Janus.4 At its core,
Janus overruled Abood v Detroit Board of Education,5 a four-decadesold precedent that allowed public employers to require employees to
pay “fair-share” or “agency” fees covering the costs that unions incur
in negotiating and administering labor contracts on the employees’ behalf. Janus invalidated thousands of public sector labor-management
contracts in more than twenty states, affecting millions of government
employees.6 The decision will likely have substantial adverse effects
on union membership and funding in the short term,7 while forcing

3

Janus, 138 S Ct at 2502 (Kagan, J, dissenting).

4

See, e.g., Sarah Jaffe, With Janus the Court Deals Unions a Crushing Blow: Now What?, NY
Times ( June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/opinion/supreme-court-janus
-unions.html; Chris Maisano, Labor’s Choice After Janus, Jacobin ( June 27, 2018), https://
jacobinmag.com/2018/06/labors-choice-after-janus; George Will, In Janus the Supreme Court
Corrects Its First Amendment Jurisprudence, National Review ( July 1, 2018), https://www
.nationalreview.com/2018/07/supreme-court-janus-decision-win-for-ﬁrst-amendment
-freedoms/.
5
421 US 209 (1977).
6
7

Janus, 138 S Ct at 2487–88 (Kagan, J, dissenting).

Id at 2487. See Henry S. Farber, Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence
Between the Public and Private Sectors, in Jane Hannaway and Andrew J. Rotherham, eds,
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unions and government to explore new ways of structuring public
sector worker representation going forward.8 At the very least, to remain viable, unions will need to reallocate resources from organizing
new workers and advocating for worker-friendly policies to soliciting
fees and collecting dues.
Long before Janus, labor unions—and American workers—were
already struggling. Globalization, the ﬁssuring of the employment relationship, intense employer hostility to worker organizing, a weak
labor law regime, and internal union deﬁciencies all had contributed
to declining rates of unionization in the private sector.9 Meanwhile,
decades of austerity politics, the privatization of public services, and
systematic conservative attack had put public sector unions on the
defensive.10 For many years, commentators had diagnosed American
labor law as ossiﬁed and impotent to meet the needs of workers in the
face of rising employer resistance and a transformed economy.11 But
with Janus and the passage of new “right-to-work” laws prohibiting
agency fees in the private sector, even in states once considered union
bastions, the American system of labor relations is no longer merely
sclerotic and ineffectual. It is now unraveling at its seams.
To understand how momentous Janus was for unions and for labor law, one must understand the system of collective labor law that
has governed since the New Deal. Both the National Labor Relations
Act (the NLRA), which applies to private sector workers, and the
Collective Bargaining in Education: Negotiating Change in Today’s Schools 27 (Harvard, 2006)
(ﬁnding that union coverage is signiﬁcantly higher where unions are allowed to negotiate
union security provisions as compared to where agency shop arrangements are prohibited).
8

See Part V.

9

See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 Yale L J 2, 13– 45 (2016); David Weil, The
Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can Be Done to Improve It
(Harvard, 2014); Katherine V. W. Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation for the
Changing Workplace (Cambridge 2004).
10
On the history of the right-to-work campaign, see Sophia Z. Lee, The Workplace Constitution from the New Deal to the New Right 56–78, 115–32, 223–55 (Cambridge, 2014); Joseph
A. McCartin and Jean-Christian Vinel, Compulsory Unionism: Sylvester Petro and the Career of
an Anti-Union Idea, 1957–1987, in Nelson Lichtenstein and Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, eds,
The American Right and U.S. Labor in America: Politics, Ideology, and Imagination 226 (Pennsylvania, 2012). On the history of austerity politics and the sustained attack on the welfare
state, see Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, The Transformation of American Politics: Activist
Government and the Rise of Conservatism (Princeton, 2007); Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State?: Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment (Cambridge, 1994).
11
See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossiﬁcation of American Labor Law, 102 Colum L Rev
1527 (2002) (arguing that the National Labor Relations Act has ossiﬁed); Paul Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 Harv L Rev
1769 (1983) (detailing the failure of the NLRA to protect workers’ right to organize).
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vast majority of state-enacted public sector labor laws embrace the
principles of majoritarian democracy. When a majority of workers in
a given bargaining unit votes to unionize, the union becomes the exclusive bargaining agent charged with representing all workers in the
unit, even those who objected to unionization.12 The union has a duty
to represent all of the workers fairly, and the negotiated contract
beneﬁts workers collectively.13 In turn, each worker must pay a fee that
covers the union’s costs germane to its role as the exclusive bargaining
agent. Without such a fee, a classic collective-action problem would
arise.14
Beginning in the 1950s, however, the Supreme Court ruled that
nonmembers could not be forced to pay for any of the union’s political
or ideological expenses.15 Such contributions in the public sector, the
Court opined in Abood, violate workers’ First Amendment rights,16
and, in the private sector, reach beyond what is permitted by statute.17
In Abood, the Court explained the rule as follows: mandatory fees to
cover collective bargaining are acceptable on the ground that the state
has an interest in negotiating with a single bargaining representative
to achieve “labor peace.”18 But, political activity, the Court concluded,
is subsidiary to unions’ core mission and risks conﬂicting with individuals’ freedom of belief.19
This compromise—compulsory dues for the cost of representation and bargaining only—is known as the “agency-shop,” or a “fair12
29 USC § 159; Emporium Capwell Co. v Western Addition Community Organization, 420
US 50 (1975); J. I. Case Co. v NLRB, 321 US 332 (1944).
13
Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171, 186 (1967); Steele v Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 US 192, 202–3
(1944).
14
See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 2
(Harvard, 1971).
15
Railway Employees Department v Hanson, 351 US 225 (1956); International Association of
Machinists v Street, 367 US 740 (1961).
16
Abood, 431 US 209. See also Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v Hudson, 475 US 292
(1986) (establishing procedures that unions must follow to ensure employees have the ability
to opt out of nonchargeable expenses).
17
Communication Workers of America v Beck, 487 US 735 (1988) (interpreting the NLRA);
International Association of Machinists v Street, 367 US 740 (1961) (interpreting the Railway
Labor Act).
18
Abood, 431 US at 224; see Ellis v Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight
Handlers, Express & Station Employees, 466 US 435, 455–56 (1984) (stating that “[i]t has long
been settled that . . . interference with First Amendment rights is justiﬁed by the governmental interest in industrial peace” and that compulsory fees are permissible when enabling
an exclusive bargaining agreement).
19

Abood, 431 US at 213, 235.
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share” system. It existed in relatively stable form for over ﬁfty years.20
States that wished to prohibit fair-share systems and ban compulsory
union fees altogether could do so for both their public and private
sector workers. Yet under such “right-to-work” systems, unions must
still represent the nonpaying workers, giving rise to a collective-action
problem of “nightmarish proportions.”21 Until recently, however, less
than half of states—nearly all in regions with little union density—had
adopted right-to-work laws.22
With the Great Recession of 2008, however, union opponents
opened up a new line of attack.23 Conservatives systematically began
pushing the argument that, in the face of stagnating wages, unionized
workers, and unionized government workers in particular, constituted an “elite” whose pay and pensions were not sustainable.24 The
proposition that public sector union contracts had become too expensive, and that unsustainable and underfunded union-won pension
plans were undermining the ﬁnances of cities and states, gained traction.25 Against this background, the National Right to Work Committee (NRTWC), which had long fought unions, and mandatory
20
Some scholars have argued that the dues settlement was a component of a “roughly evenhanded” compromise that reduced constitutional protection for both pro- and anti-union
speech. Laura Weinrib, The Right to Work and the Right to Strike, 2017 U Chi Legal F 513,
536 (2018); Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 Mich L Rev 169, 184–
85, 193 (2015) (describing compromise as a quid pro quo).
21
Janus, 138 S Ct at 2490 (Kagan, J, dissenting); Abood, 431 US at 220–22. For further
discussion of the collective action problem, see Catherine L. Fisk and Martin H. Malin, After
Janus, 107 Cal L Rev ∗6–16 (forthcoming 2019), https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/ﬁles/lwp/ﬁles
/2019-ﬁsk-c-malin-m-after_janus-clr-107.pdf.
22
Right to Work States Timeline (National Right to Work Committee), https://nrtwc.org
/facts/state-right-to-work-timeline/.
23
Joseph A. McCartin, Public Sector Unionism Under Assault: How to Combat the Scapegoating
of Organized Labor, 22 New Labor F 54, 55–56 (2013); Richard B. Freeman and Eunice Han,
The War Against Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the U.S., 54 J Industrial Relations 386
(2012).
24
For some examples of the recent scholarly attack on public sector unions, see Daniel
DiSalvo, Government Against Itself: Public Union Power and Its Consequences (Oxford, 2015);
Steven Greenhut, Plunder!: How Public Employee Unions Are Raiding Treasuries, Controlling Our
Lives, and Bankrupting the Nation (Forum, 2009); Steven Malanga of the Manhattan Institute
added Shakedown: The Continuing Conspiracy Against the American Taxpayer (Ivan R. Dee, 2010);
Mallory Factor, Shadowbosses: Government Unions Control America and Rob Taxpayers Blind
(Center Street, 2012). For a history of the conservative legal movement more generally, see,
e.g., Jefferson Decker, The Other Rights Revolution: Conservative Lawyers and the Remaking of
American Government (Oxford, 2016); Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal
Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law (Princeton, 2008); Joseph Fishkin and David E.
Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 Colum L Rev 915, 951–59 (2018).
25

McCartin, 22 New Labor F at 56 (cited in note 23).
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fees in particular,26 began a renewed attack on agency fees in state
legislatures and in the courts.27
In 2012, the conservative majority on the Supreme Court took up
the cause, reaching out to grant certiorari in cases presenting the
constitutionality of public sector union fees, despite the absence of
any circuit splits. Invoking the First Amendment, the Court began to
chip away at the agency-fee system. In Knox v SEIU,28 Justice Alito,
writing for the majority, constructed new rules that made it harder for
unions to collect fees, while warning that Abood’s holding is “something of an anomaly.”29 In 2014, in Harris v Quinn,30 he—and the
Court—went further. In Harris, home-care workers in Illinois contested paying fees to the union elected by a majority of fellow homecare workers. In extended dicta, Justice Alito, writing for the majority,
questioned Abood’s analysis and suggested that the First Amendment
should prohibit fair-share fees in public sector employment generally.31 But the Harris Court stopped short of overruling Abood, concluding instead that while the home-care workers could not be required to pay an agency fee, Abood did not squarely control their
situation because they were only quasi–public sector employees.32 In
2016, in Friedrichs v California Teachers Association,33 the Court seemed
poised to ﬁnish what Knox and Harris began: to hold that the First
Amendment prohibits fair-share agreements of any sort in the public
sector. With Justice Scalia’s death, however, the Court split 4–4, thus
afﬁrming the decision below without opinion, and letting stand existing doctrine.34
During this same period, the NRTWC and conservative Republicans pushed for anti-union laws in previously union-friendly states,

26
See generally Lee, The Workplace Constitution (cited in note 10); McCartin and Vinel,
Compulsory Unionism (cited in note 10).
27
McCartin, 22 New Labor F at 57–58 (cited in note 23); Moshe Z. Marvit, For 60 Years,
This Powerful Conservative Group Has Worked to Crush Labor, The Nation ( July 5, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/group-turned-right-work-crusade-crush-labor/.
28
29

Knox v Service Employees International Union, 567 US 298 (2012).
Id at 311.

30

134 S Ct 2618 (2014).

31

Id at 2630–34.
Id at 2634–38.

32
33

136 S Ct 1083 (Mem) (2016) (per curiam).

34

Id.
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bringing the total number of states that prohibit agency fees in the
private sector to twenty-seven.35 Michigan, the birthplace of the once
mighty United Auto Workers, enacted an expansive right-to-work law
in 2012.36 That same year, Indiana expanded its prohibition on agency
fees to cover all private sector employment.37 Wisconsin enacted a
series of even more far-reaching laws, prohibiting agency fees in the
private sector, while stripping most governmental workers of their
collective bargaining rights.38 The right-to-work campaigns were part
of a broader, long-running project to undermine unions and to weaken
the Democratic Party, with which unions had long been associated.39
Janus represents the capstone of the anti-union campaign. With
the newly appointed Justice Gorsuch supplying the ﬁfth vote, Justice Alito declared for the conservative majority: “Fundamental free
speech rights are at stake.”40 “States and public-sector unions may no
longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees,” he explained.41 Indeed, Alito went further, holding that the First Amend-

35
Right to Work States Timeline (cited in note 22). But see Noam Scheiber, Missouri Voters
Reject Anti-Union Law in a Victory for Labor, NY Times (Aug 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/08/07/business/economy/missouri-labor-right-to-work.html. The NLRA has been
interpreted to allow states to enact “right to work” laws prohibiting agreements under which
unions obtain a “union security clause” obliging all employees to pay any fees as a requirement
of employment. For reasons eloquently explained by Judge Diane Wood, this statutory interpretation is questionable. See Sweeney v Pence, 767 F3d 654, 671 (7th Cir 2014) (Wood
dissenting); see also Brief of Law Professors Andrias, Estlund, Fisk, Lee, and Weinrib as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellants, International Union of Operating Engineers Local 139 v Schimel,
863 F3d 674 (7th Cir 2017).
36
Monica Davey, Limits on Unions Pass in Michigan, Once a Mainstay, NY Times (Dec 1,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/us/protesters-rally-over-michigan-union-limits
-plan.html. See Mich Comp Laws § 423.14.
37
Monica Davey, Indiana Governor Signs a Law Creating a “Right to Work” State, NY Times
(Feb 1 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/us/indiana-becomes-right-to-work-state
.html. See Ind Code § 22-6-6.
38
Monica Davey, Unions Suffer Latest Defeat in Midwest with Signing of Wisconsin Measure,
NY Times (March 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/us/gov-scott-walker-of
-wisconsin-signs-right-to-work-bill.html; Monica Davey, Wisconsin Senate Limits Bargaining
by Public Workers, NY Times (March 9, 2011), http://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com
/2011/03/10/us/10wisconsin.html. See Wis Stat § 111.04; 2011 Wis Laws 10.
39
See Lee, The Workplace Constitution (cited in note 10); Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt
Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics (Pennsylvania, 2015). Compare
with James Feigenbaum, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, and Vanessa Williamson, From the
Bargaining Table to the Ballot Box: Political Effects of Right to Work Laws (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No 24259, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24259
.pdf (describing political effects of right-to-work laws).
40

138 S Ct at 2460.

41

Id at 2486.
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ment protects not only a right to opt out of union fees but requires that
workers afﬁrmatively consent before any fees can be taken from their
paychecks.42
II
The majority opinion was stunning in its subversion of traditional principles of stare decisis. As Justice Kagan emphasized in
dissent, Abood was not just any precedent. It was one on which there
was extensive and widespread reliance in state law and contract. By
overruling Abood, the Court “wreak[ed] havoc on entrenched legislative and contractual arrangements.”43 And it did so notwithstanding
that the other factors for stare decisis were met.44 The lower courts
had not struggled to apply Abood.45 The Abood rule was deeply embedded in federal constitutional law.46 Abood cohered with the Court’s
approach to reviewing regulation of public employees’ speech in the
nonunion context, such as in Pickering v Board of Education.47 And
Abood’s requirement that workers afﬁrmatively opt out of union dues
was in line with broader First Amendment doctrine in which the
Court has required that dissenters object to compulsory speech; dissent is not presumed.48 Indeed, the only basis for the claim that Abood
42
Id. Compare with Aaron Tang, Janus and the Law of Opt-Out Rights, Harv L Rev Blog
( July 2, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/janus-and-the-law-of-opt-out-rights/ (emphasizing novelty of the opt-out rule).
43
138 S Ct at 2499 (Kagan, J, dissenting). Compare with Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808,
827 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving
property and contract rights. . . .”).
44
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 867–68 (1992)
(discussing factors in stare decisis analysis).
45
138 S Ct at 2498 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
46
See, e.g., Locke v Karass, 555 US 207, 213–14 (2009); Lehnert v Ferris Faculty Association,
500 US 507, 519 (1991); Teachers v Hudson, 475 US 292, 301–02 (1986); Ellis v Brotherhood of
Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employees, 466 US 435,
455–57 (1984). The Court had also relied on the rule when deciding cases involving compelled speech subsidies outside the labor sphere, in circumstances involving, for example, bar
dues and student association fees. See, e.g., Keller v State Bar of California, 496 US 1, 9–17
(1990) (state bar fees); Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v Southworth, 529 US
217, 230–32 (2000) (public university student activity fees); Glickman v Wileman Brothers &
Elliott, Inc., 521 US 457, 471–73 (1997) (commercial advertising assessments).
47
391 US 563 (1968) (holding that the First Amendment protects speech on matters of
public concern but that public employers have a right to manage their workforces by restricting employment-related speech); Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 US 410 (2006) (discussing
doctrine); Janus, 138 S Ct at 2492–97 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
48
See West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943) (striking down state
regulation requiring expulsion of schoolchildren who refused to recite the Pledge of Alle-
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had become “an outlier among [the Court’s] First Amendment cases”
was the doctrine Justice Alito had himself penned, in recent years,
with the clear aim of weakening Abood—and unions.49 The Court,
Kagan charged, was doing far more than overruling a long-standing
precedent. It was threatening the rule of law by undermining “the
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”50
But debates about stare decisis ultimately turn on how right or
wrong the underlying decision is on the merits. If Lawrence v Texas 51
is correct—if Bowers v Hardwick52 was wrong from the day it was decided—stare decisis worries abate.53 So is Janus correct on the merits?
And if not, why not?
Kagan’s answer to this question was again vehement. Recalling debates from the New Deal, she invoked the relationship between courts
and majoritarian institutions: “There is no sugarcoating today’s opinion. The majority . . . prevents the American people, acting through
their state and local ofﬁcials, from making important choices about
workplace governance.”54 The most “alarming” feature of the majority’s opinion, she explained, was that it was using the Constitution to
designate winners and losers in what should be understood as a policy
debate.55 The Court was “turning the First Amendment into a sword,
giance); Wooley v Maynard, 430 US 705 (1977) (holding that a Jehovah’s witness could not be
criminally prosecuted for obscuring the state motto of New Hampshire, “Live Free or Die,”
on the prefabricated license plate of his automobile).
49

Janus, 138 S Ct at 2498 (Kagan, J, dissenting).

50

Id at 2478, quoting Payne, 501 US at 827. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv L Rev 54, 109, 112 (1997) (describing justiﬁcations for the
principle of stare decisis as promoting fairness, efﬁciency, predictability, and stability, and
noting that “[t]o invite indiscriminate re-ﬁghting of constitutional battles, and to raise attendant doubts about the stability of doctrine generally, would do more to retard than to
advance the project of constitutionalism . . .”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum L Rev 723, 742– 46, 757 (1988) (noting that in constitutional matters the Court has been relatively unconstrained by its own precedents but
arguing that “precedent binds absent a showing of substantial countervailing
considerations”). See also Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Speech, 115 Mich L Rev 439 (2017)
(critiquing Court’s recent willingness to ignore precedent in First Amendment cases).
51
539 US 558 (2003).
52
478 US 186 (1986).
53
Lawrence, 539 US at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not
correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent.”). But compare with Frederick
Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan L Rev 571, 575 (1987) (“[I]f we are truly arguing from precedent,
then the fact that something was decided before gives it present value despite our current
belief that the previous decision was erroneous.”).
54
55

Janus, 138 S Ct at 2501 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
Id.
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and using it against workaday economic and regulatory policy.”56 It was
“weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges,
now and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.”57 As Kagan asserted, this was “not the ﬁrst time the Court ha[d]
wielded the First Amendment in such an aggressive way.”58
Kagan was echoing a charge made by multiple observers that the
Roberts Court has used the First Amendment much as the Lochner
Court did the Due Process Clause—to thwart democratically chosen
outcomes and, more speciﬁcally, to protect the privileges of the economically powerful while resisting legislative and executive efforts to
advance the interests of the less powerful.59 Kagan cited two recent
cases, National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v Becerra60 and
Sorrell v IMS Health Inc.61 She could have added numerous others,
including FEC v Wisconsin Right to Life,62 Citizens United v FEC,63

56
57
58

Id.
Id.
Janus, 138 S Ct at 2501 (Kagan, J, dissenting).

59

See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler and David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 Colum L Rev 1953, 1959–60 (2018); Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating
First Amendment, 118 Colum L Rev 2117, 2158–59 (2018); Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor
Vision of the First Amendment: Past as Prologue, 118 Colum L Rev 2057, 2062–63 (2018); Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment and Class Entrenchment, 118
Colum L Rev 2161 (2018); Weinrib, 2017 U Chi Legal F at 533–35 (cited in note 20); Amanda
Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 Wis L Rev 133 (2016); Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First
Amendment at Work, 51 Harv CR-CL L Rev 323, 323–24 (2016); Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise
Lochnerism, 115 Colum L Rev 1453, 1455–57 (2015); Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court v. America, Democracy (Winter 2012), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/23/the-roberts-court-v
-america; Joseph Fishkin and William E. Forbath, Constitutional Political Economy When the
Court Is to the Right of the Country, Balkinization ( June 28, 2018), http://balkin.blogspot.com
/2018/06/constitutional-political-economy-when.html. See also Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early
Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 Colum L Rev 1915, 1917–18 nn 5–8 (2016) (collecting
sources published from 2011 to 2016 that suggest the First Amendment has been “hijacked” by
antistatist, economically libertarian interests).
60
138 S Ct 2361 (2018) (invalidating a law requiring medical and counseling facilities to
provide relevant factual information to patients).
61

564 US 552 (2011) (striking down a law that restricted pharmacies from selling data).

551 US 449 (2007) (holding that the federal campaign ﬁnance law’s prohibition on use of
corporate funds to ﬁnance electioneering communications during pre-federal-election periods violated corporation’s free speech rights when applied to its issue-advocacy advertisements).
62

63
558 US 310 (2010) (striking down on First Amendment grounds federal restrictions on
corporate “electioneering communications”).
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Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v Bennett,64 McCutcheon v FEC,65 and Harris v Quinn.66
As scholars have detailed, the Roberts Court’s First Amendment
cases, taken together, expand the scope of activity that the First Amendment protects, transforming what was previously understood as ordinary business activity into protected speech.67 The decisions are also
increasingly absolutist: once the speech interest is identiﬁed, the governmental interest is nearly always insufﬁcient to justify the regulation. The cases thus enable individuals and corporations to opt out of
democratically made decisions, while disabling the government from
engaging in regulation, frequently, regulation that achieves redistribution.68 An empirical study recently concluded, “[n]early half of
First Amendment legal challenges now beneﬁt business corporations and trade groups, rather than other kinds of organizations or
individuals.”69
III
At the very end of the opinion, Kagan brieﬂy moved beyond
critique to gesture toward an afﬁrmative vision for the First Amendment. “The First Amendment,” she asserted, “was meant for better
things. It was meant not to undermine but to protect democratic
governance—including over the role of public-sector unions.”70 But

64
564 US 721 (2011) (striking down on First Amendment grounds provision of Arizona’s
Citizens Clean Elections Act which provided matching funds to publicly ﬁnanced candidates
when privately funded opponent’s spending exceeds the publicly ﬁnanced candidate’s initial
state allotment).
65
572 US 185 (2014) (striking down on First Amendment grounds Federal Elections Campaign Act’s (FECA) aggregate limit on candidate contributions and other contributions to party
committees).
66
134 S Ct 2618 (2014) (striking down on First Amendment grounds agency fee requirement for home-care workers).
67
See sources cited in notes 61–66; see also Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S Ct 2751
(2014) (holding that the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act permits commercial enterprises to opt out of laws they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs).
68
See Garden, 51 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 332 (cited in note 59); Kessler and Pozen,
118 Colum L Rev at 1960 (cited in note 59); Purdy, 118 Colum L Rev at 2162–63 (cited in
note 59). For further discussion of the implications of this doctrine, see Part IV.
69
John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, & Implications,
30 Const Comm 223, 224 (2015).
70
Janus, 138 S Ct at 2502 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
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what does it mean to say that the First Amendment is meant for better
things? Despite Kagan’s searing assessment of the majority’s approach,
her opinion offered scant explanation of what a First Amendment
doctrine protecting democratic governance would look like.
Instead, in offering an alternative to the weaponized First Amendment, Kagan looked backward to Abood. Her dissent rested on a defense of Abood’s essential compromise—its acceptance of compulsory
union fees to cover expenses germane to collective bargaining but not
to politics. Yet while Abood’s outcome was tolerable for unions, the
opinion’s reasoning was deeply ﬂawed on at least three levels. First,
Abood overstated the speech harm to dissenting workers. Second, it
fundamentally misdeﬁned the role of unions and their relationship
to politics, as well as the public’s interest in labor questions. Third,
it adopted a crabbed understanding of the government’s interest in
facilitating unions, one that rested on a narrow and one-sided view of
the speech rights at stake. Ultimately, Abood offered, at best, a feeble
defense of public sector unions and their relationship to democratic
governance. At worst, the Abood compromise helped to sow the seeds
for the weaponized, Lochner-ized First Amendment.71
a
The Janus majority and dissent share a basic premise: dues payments are a form of compelled speech protected by the First Amendment. That premise, which lies at the core of the “weaponized First
Amendment,” long predates the Roberts Court.
Prior to World War II, the lawyers who championed the freedom
of speech and expression were concerned, above all, with protecting
labor’s rights—the right to organize, to picket, to strike.72 But as early

71
Consider Kessler, 116 Colum L Rev at 1922 (cited in note 59) (arguing that First Amendment Lochner-ism long predates the Roberts Court and that economically libertarian tendencies “may be intrinsic to judicial enforcement of civil liberties”).
72
Laura Weinrib, The Taming of Free Speech: America’s Civil Liberties Compromise (Harvard,
2016). For additional work exploring how progressive lawyers, administrators, and activists
invoked a range of constitutional rights, largely but not exclusively outside of the courts, in
the hopes of building a more socioeconomically equal, pluralistic, and democratic society, see
Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 Colum L Rev
1083 (2014); Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Harvard, 2007); Ken I. Kersch,
Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities in the Development of American Constitutional Law
(Cambridge, 2004); Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and
the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 Va L Rev 1 (2000); James Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 Yale L J 941 (1997).
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as the mid-1930s, conservative lawyers and businessmen began to
reframe their Lochner-era substantive due process arguments in the
language of the First Amendment, challenging New Deal regulation
and collective labor rights as threats to free expression and individual
rights.73 By the postwar period, liberal lawyers and politicians shared
some of conservatives’ concerns about growing labor power and the
“totalitarian” reach of the administrative state.74 Ultimately, they coalesced around a compromise that allowed deferential review of ordinary economic legislation but promised active judicial review to
protect individual civil liberties.75 The line between economic policy
and individual liberties was, however, contested from the outset. By the
mid-1940s, the Supreme Court had already begun to invoke the First
Amendment to protect employers’ right to oppose unionization—
with support from both business groups and the American Civil Liberties Union.76
Ironically, the Court’s move to constitutionalizing a right to opt
out of union dues can be traced to a 1956 case involving a private sector
workforce, where the First Amendment typically does not apply.77 In
Railway Employees Department v Hanson,78 the NRTW Foundation
argued that the Railway Labor Act violated the First Amendment
because it allowed railroad employers to compel employees to join and
support unions.79 The Court found state action, but without deciding
73
Weinrib, Taming of Free Speech at 226–310 (cited in note 72); Kessler, 116 Colum L Rev
at 1925–36 (cited in note 59); Kate E. Andrias, A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech in
Workplace Representation Elections, 112 Yale L J 2415, 2423–26 (2003); Lee, The Workplace
Constitution (cited in note 10). See also Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, 1930s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv L Rev 1, 52–62 (2017).
74
Kessler, 114 Colum L Rev at 757–73 (cited in note 72). See also Weinrib, 2017 U Chi
Legal F at 526–29 (cited in note 20) (describing how the Court backed away from its protection of labor’s concerted activity).
75
See Laura M. Weinrib, The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties, Labor, and the Limits of
State Power, 1917–1940 (May 1, 2011) (unpublished PhD diss., Princeton University), http://
chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articlep1005&contextpother_publications.
The oft-cited judicial encapsulation of this view is United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US
144, 152 n 4 (1938).
76
NLRB v Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 US 469 (1941). See Weinrib, 17 U Chi Legal
F at 529 (cited in note 20); Weinrib, Taming of Free Speech at ch 8 (cited in note 72); see also
Andrias, 112 Yale L J at 2423–26 (cited in note 73).
77
See Lee, The Workplace Constitution at 75–78, 89–93, 103, 124, 166–67, 179–82, 216–17,
245–53 (cited in note 10) (providing a history of the relationship between the state-action
doctrine and debates about exclusive representation).
78

351 US 225 (1956).

79

See Lee, The Workplace Constitution at 122–29 (cited in note 10).
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the First Amendment question it rejected the NRTW’s argument on
the ground that nothing in the record indicated that the union was
actually spending money for political purposes.80
A few years later, however, in International Association of Machinists
v Street, the Court concluded that railroad collective-bargaining
agreements requiring payment of union dues or fees do raise First
Amendment concerns to the extent that the union spends the money
on political causes.81 The Court then avoided the constitutional issue
by reading—or straining to read—the Railway Labor Act (RLA) not
to authorize union security provisions that require employees to pay
fees to support political causes.82 In 1977, the Court extended the
compelled-speech holding to public sector workers with Abood—the
case Janus overruled. The Court ruled that Michigan could not
constitutionally allow expenditure of agency fees on political activities over the objection of Detroit’s nonunion teachers.83 The Court
also applied the same logic to state bars in Keller v State Bar of California, holding that attorneys’ bar dues could not be used for political
advocacy that was not “germane” to “the State’s interest in regulating
the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services.”84
Later, the Court brought its reasoning back to the private sector in
Communications Workers v Beck, as a matter of statutory construction
of the National Labor Relations Act.85
Throughout this circuitous line of cases, however, the Court never
offered a satisfying explanation for why requiring workers to subsidize a union (or requiring citizens to subsidize another representative
organization) constitutes a violation of the First Amendment.86 Com-

80
The Court found state action on a theory like the one it adopted in Shelley v Kraemer,
334 US 1, 20 (1948) (government enforcement of restrictive covenants is state action). According to the Court, the RLA’s preemption of a state law invalidating a contract made the
contract terms state action. But the Court never extended this theory beyond the RLA. See
Lee, The Workplace Constitution (cited in note 10).
81
367 US 740, 749 (1961).
82

Id at 750–70.

83

431 US at 225–56.
496 US 1, 13 (1990).

84
85
86

487 US 735 (1988).

Several scholars have argued that there is no persuasive answer. William Baude and
Eugene Volokh, Comment, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 Harv L Rev 171
(2018); see also Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chermerinsky, Exaggerating the Effects of Janus: A
Reply to Professors Baude and Volokh, 132 Harv L Rev F 42 (2018) (agreeing that Janus was
wrongly decided because paying money for services is not compelled speech that violates the
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pulsory payment of fees does not constitute “true ‘compelled speech’”
in which an individual is obliged personally to express a message with
which he disagrees.87 Compulsory payment of fees also does not restrict the payor’s own speech. As Justice Frankfurter wrote in his Street
dissent, union objectors are not subject to “suppression of their true
beliefs.”88 “The individual member may express his views in any public
or private forum as freely as he could before the union collected his
dues.”89
From this vantage point, union dues are analogous to the wide range
of circumstances where the government compels speech without
triggering any First Amendment inquiry.90 For example, legislators
require witnesses to testify at hearings; judges insist that jurors pronounce verdicts; agency heads force regulated entities to report all
sorts of information.91 Like union dues, these compulsions occur
without attribution of particular views to the speaker and without a
restriction of the speaker’s own speech.92
First Amendment); Catherine L. Fisk and Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the
Contradictions of Compelled Speech, 48 Loyola LA L Rev 439 (2015) (arguing that the Court
wrongly ﬁnds compelled speech in union dues while ignoring the associational rights of
unions). Brishen Rogers disagrees with the Abood approach, but he notes that it is broadly
consistent with a mid-century “civil libertarian” approach that emphasized individual rights
and expression in the political sphere but not the economic sphere. See Brishen Rogers, Three
Concepts of Workplace Freedom of Association, 37 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 177 (2016).
87
Justice Scalia drew the distinction between true compelled speech and compelled subsidization of speech in Johanns v Livestock Marketing Association, 544 US 550, 557 (2005). For
examples of cases the Court sees as involving “true compelled speech,” see West Virginia
Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943); Wooley v Maynard, 430 US 705 (1977).
88
Street, 367 US at 805 (Frankfurter, J, dissenting).
89

Id at 806.

90

Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v Livestock Marketing Association, 2005
Supreme Court Review 195, 216 (2005). See also Nikolas Bowie, The Government Could Not
Work Doctrine, 105 Va L Rev ∗1 (forthcoming 2019), https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php
?IDp8661050711221030891020911200920170750310540710450170870951101031011
05001067068114109106101006099105006110085012114086100114098007082094092014
08311510208402201506508609004407612601011707311212002502302607912000511109
8118107092092076091073071026017083097&EXTppdf (arguing that applying strict scrutiny
to objectionable compulsion undermines government’s ability to function).
Id at ∗35; Post, 2005 Supreme Court Review at 216 (cited in note 90).
The Court has inconsistently relied on the distinction between compulsions that require
endorsement of speech or imputation of views and compulsions that do not. Compare Rumsfeld
v Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 547 US 47 (2006) (emphasizing distinction between compelled subsidization of speech and compelled endorsement of speech and upholding
a federal statute that required institutions of higher education to provide military recruiters
equal access to that provided to other employers); Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
System v Southworth, 529 US 217 (2000) (upholding university requirement that students pay
fees to support organizations as long as university distributed fees in viewpoint neutral manner);
91
92
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More to the point, if union dues constitute compelled speech, it is
hard to see why fees and taxes imposed by the government do not as
well.93 As Justice Frankfurter emphasized in his Street dissent, the
government requires us to pay for speech by the government all the
time.94 Paciﬁsts must pay taxes knowing some portion will be used to
subsidize pro-military expression. Climate change deniers must fund
signiﬁcant environmental measures expressing the contrary. Atheists
must fund the speech of numerous government chaplains. None of
these individuals has a First Amendment claim.95 So too, the Court
has held that the government may compel us to fund the speech of
private actors, including political candidates through the public ﬁnancing of political campaigns.96 This is true even though the Court
has concluded that restrictions on campaign expenditures violate the
First Amendment.97 In Justice Frankfurter’s words, “[o]n the largest

Glickman v Wileman Brothers & Elliot, Inc., 521 US 457 (1997) (upholding a federal marketing
program for California summer fruits that required private parties to subsidize advertising
campaign on ground that program did not require endorsement); PruneYard Shopping Center v
Robins, 447 US 74, 87 (1980) (holding that state constitutional provisions authorizing individuals to petition on the property of a privately owned shopping center did not raise First
Amendment concerns even though it required the property owners to subsidize speech; the
views of the persons petitioning would “not likely be identiﬁed with those of the owner”), with
Agency for International Development v Alliance for Open Society International, 570 US 205, 208,
213, 218 (2013) (striking down a statute that prohibited federal funds from going to
organizations that did not have “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafﬁcking”
because the government was “compelling a grant recipient to adopt a particular belief as a
condition of funding”).
93
Baude and Volokh, 132 Harv L Rev at 9–13 (cited in note 86); Bowie, 105 Va L Rev at
∗
24–25 (cited in note 90).
94
International Association of Machinists v Street, 367 US 740, 808 (1961) (Frankfurter, J,
dissenting).
95
See United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 260 (1982) (“The tax system could not function if
denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a
manner that violates their religious belief.”); Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association, 485 US 439, 451–52 (1988) (emphasizing that the First Amendment does not
allow citizens to veto public programs of which they do not approve); Johanns, 544 US at 562
(“[Citizens] have no First Amendment right not to fund government speech. And that is no
less true when the funding is achieved through targeted assessments devoted exclusively to
the program to which the assessed citizens object.”). For further discussion, see Bowie, 105 Va
L Rev at ∗23–25 (cited in note 90); compare with Part IV (discussing developments post Janus).
96
Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 91–92 (1976) (per curiam) (rejecting a challenge to the federal
campaign ﬁnance law that compelled taxpayers to subsidize presidential candidates who asked
for public funding and upholding the ﬁnancing scheme as no different from “any other
appropriation from the general revenue”).
97
See Bowie, 105 Va L Rev at ∗23 (cited in note 90) (analyzing Court’s public ﬁnancing
holding in Buckley v Valeo); Baude and Volokh, 132 Harv L Rev at 189–90 (cited in note 86)
(questioning the analogy between compelling to give money and restricting money).
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scale, the Federal Government expends revenue collected from individual taxpayers to propagandize ideas which many taxpayers oppose.”98
The Court has recognized the tension between the Abood line of
cases prohibiting compelled subsidization and the obligation to pay
taxes and other government fees, but has provided little reasoned
justiﬁcation for the distinction.99 It has simply asserted that “[c]itizens
may challenge compelled support of private speech, but have no First
Amendment right not to fund government speech.”100 Notably, the
Court has not clariﬁed whether compelled subsidization of government speech does not implicate speech interests or rather whether
the government’s interest in raising revenue and maintaining its
operations outweighs any speech harm.101
Justice Powell—who would have restricted agency fees even more
than the majority in Abood—claimed that subsidization of government speech was different than subsidization of private organizations
because government was “representative of the people.”102 But under
this logic, compulsion to contribute to a union should be permissible
as well: a fundamental tenet of labor law is that the union is a majoritarian body that must represent all workers in the bargaining unit
fairly; and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 is designed to ensure that all workers are entitled to rights of
democratic participation.103
By deeming compelled union fees protected speech, Abood helped
to lay the foundation for the weaponized First Amendment.104 For
98

Street, 367 US at 808 (Frankfurter, J, dissenting).

99

Compare United States v United Foods, Inc., 533 US 405 (2001) (holding that mandatory
check-off for generic mushroom advertising violated the First Amendment) with Johanns, 544
US at 566–67 (because the generic beef advertising at issue was the government’s own speech
it was exempt from First Amendment scrutiny). See Post, 2005 Supreme Court Review at 197
(cited in note 90).
100
Johanns, 544 US at 562; see also id at 559, quoting Southworth, 529 US at 529 (“[I]t
seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other
expression to advocate and defend its own policies.”).
101
102

Id.
Abood v Detroit Board of Education, 431 US 209, 259 n 13 (1977) (Powell, J, concurring).

103
See 29 USC §§ 411–15; Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association v Lynn, 488 US
347 (1989); Fisk and Malin, 107 Cal Law Rev at ∗4 (cited in note 21).
104
The Court’s increasing solicitude for commercial speech also played an important role
in the weaponizing of the First Amendment. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v Public
Service Commission of New York, 447 US 557, 566 (1980); Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 19 (1976);
First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765, 784 (1978); Virginia State Board of
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if union dues cause a First Amendment harm worthy of strict scrutiny—even though they involve payment to a representative, democratic body and do not require actual speech by the payor, restrict the
payor’s speech, or risk attribution of a view to the payor—all sorts of
other compulsions could too, certainly much governmental regulation and perhaps even some taxes.105
b
The problem with Abood’s reasoning, however, stems not only
from the initial determination that the First Amendment is implicated but also from what followed next. One could grant that union
dues constitute an infringement on dissenters’ freedom of speech (or
association) rights but recognize that the infringement is marginal,
while engaging in a reasoned inquiry about the social value of union
dues. Here, too, however, Abood and the Janus dissent fell short.
American constitutional rights over the twentieth century have
frequently been framed as absolutes.106 In the First Amendment area,
once a regulation falls into the category of restricting or compelling
protected speech, and in particular political speech, the regulation is
likely to fail. The work is done by the categorization.107 At that point,
little attention is paid to how burdensome a regime is in practice, or
how good a reason the government has for its regulation in light of
the particular situation. Janus is part and parcel of this approach: once
the Court concluded that political speech was burdened, the union
objector was destined to win. The government’s interests could not
outweigh this categorically grievous harm.
Abood and the Janus dissent, at ﬁrst blush, appear to take a different
approach, weighing the government’s interest in labor peace, and
therefore in exclusive representation, against the objecting worker’s
interest in not being compelled to subsidize speech with which she
disagrees. Having so balanced, Abood concluded that the government’s
interest could prevail with respect to matters germane to collective
Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 US 748, 762 (1976); Garden, 51 Harv
CR-CL L Rev at 325 (cited in note 56); Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W Va
L Rev 867 (2015).
105
See Part IV.
106
107

Jamal Greene, Foreword, Rights as Trumps?, 132 Harv L Rev 28 (2018).

Id at 40. See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 Harv L Rev 22, 58 (1992).
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bargaining. But, in fact, Abood was nearly as categorical as Janus, for
the Abood Court agreed that dues for political speech were absolutely
protected. This is the position Justice Kagan defended.
The compromise that divided political activity from matters germane to collective bargaining was understood to be a victory for
unions when ﬁrst announced, and from a ﬁnancial perspective, it
worked fairly well for labor organizations for forty plus years.108 But
as Alito argued in Janus, it is untenable to see politics as not germane
to unions’ work.109 Indeed, in deﬁning all political activity as not
germane to unions’ core function, Abood fundamentally misdeﬁned
unions. It implied that the primary job of unions is that of private
business agents whose goal is to resolve narrow disputes for a deﬁned
set of members, rather than as organizations participating in a broader
deliberation, and sometimes struggle, about the legitimacy of social
practices relating to workers’ lives, including both the scope of employer authority and the distribution of resources in society.110
Throughout its history, the American labor movement’s relationship to politics—and to the state—has been complicated and multifaceted.111 Yet it has never been so limited as the Abood line of cases
suggests. As far back as the Gilded Age, broad and radical reform politics characterized the views of the mainstream labor movement.112
The Knights of Labor in the 1880s, who organized unskilled and
skilled workers together, sought to transform an economic system of

108
See Lee, The Workplace Constitution at 131 (cited in note 10) (“[l]abor advocates agreed
that they had emerged from Street relatively unscathed” and describing Street as a “major
loss” for the right-to-work movement).
109
The division of the political from the economic characterized other areas of labor law in
the post–New Deal era, presenting similar problems. See Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private
Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U Pa L Rev 1358 (1981); Rogers, 37 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L
at 28–29 (cited in note 86). The Janus majority also objected to the Abood compromise on the
ground that the line between matters of public concern and matters germane to collective
bargaining is hard to draw. But, as Kagan correctly notes, many lines are hard to draw and
courts nonetheless draw them. Moreover, there is little evidence that courts have had signiﬁcant difﬁculties separating chargeable and nonchargeable expenses. See Ellis v Brotherhood
of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employees, 466 US
435 (1984).
110
See Don Herzog, Household Politics: Conﬂict in Early Modern England 99–100 (2013)
(describing politics as the realm of conﬂict over legitimate authority and, more broadly, over
the legitimacy of social practices).
111
See, e.g., Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the
Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880–1960 (Cambridge, 1985); William E. Forbath,
The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 Harv L Rev 1109, 1185–95 (1989).
112

Forbath, 102 Harv L Rev at 1121–23 (cited in note 111).
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“wage slavery” into one committed to “republican liberty.”113 By the
early twentieth century, in response to widespread court injunctions
against labor activity, the rising American Federation of Labor (AFL)
had adopted a less political, more “voluntarist” approach, the primary
goal of which was to remove the coercive power of the state from industrial relations.114 Yet the AFL, too, used political strategies to
achieve its goals, eventually winning the Norris LaGuardia Act and
the Clayton Act, which limited the ability of federal courts to enjoin
labor action.115
The rise of the Congress of Industrial Unions (CIO) in the 1930s
and ’40s saw the return of a competing approach, as the more radical
industrial unions saw politics and economics as inexorably connected,
and advanced a vision of social democracy as well as industrial unionism.116 Their efforts were in line with Progressives and New Dealers
who envisioned a broad role for worker organizations and other civic
associations in government—and a robust role for the state in enabling
such involvement.117
Despite the competing visions of unionism, during this period both
the AFL and the CIO used legislative and administrative strategies, as
well as shop-ﬂoor militancy, to advance their goals.118 In the aftermath of the postwar Taft-Hartley reforms, which constrained labor’s
ability to engage in militant class-wide collective action and otherwise limited its strength, subsequent decades saw a return toward a
113
Alex Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican
Liberty in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 2015); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and
Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich L Rev 1, 58 (1999).
114

Forbath, 102 Harv L Rev at 1118 (cited in note 111).

115

Id at 1226–33; Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of American Labor 63–
65 (Princeton, 2d ed 2013).
116
Lichtenstein, State of the Union at 32, 43–53, 100–05, 185–86 (cited in note 115);
Forbath, 98 Mich L Rev at 62–76 (cited in note 113); Kate Andrias, An American Approach to
Social Democracy: The Forgotten History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 Yale L J ∗616, 652–
53 (forthcoming 2019) (on ﬁle with author). The industrial unions also organized across
traditional boundaries of job categories, race, and gender in an effort to build a more egalitarian political economy.
117
Id at ∗642–51.
118
Andrias, 128 Yale L J (cited in note 116); Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the
Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 Harv L Rev 1379 (1993); Lichtenstein, State of the Union at 43–64 (cited in note 115); Forbath, 98 Mich L Rev (cited in note
113). See also Street, 367 US at 800 (Frankfurter, J, dissenting) (“The AFL, surely the conservative labor group, sponsored as early as 1893 an extensive program of political demands
calling for compulsory education, an eight-hour day, employer tort liability, and other social
reforms.”).
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less political unionism, one focused more on internal representation
rather than broad-reaching social change.119 Yet even in these decades, unions engaged in extensive political activity to advance the
interests of working people, from efforts to enact national legislation
like the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Affordable Care
Act, to ﬁghts to shape trade policy, to local campaigns for public
housing and state employment law.120
The history of public sector labor unions is similarly political,
perhaps more so. Public sector workers in municipal and state government were largely nonunion in the 1950s, but by the early 1960s,
their wages had fallen behind their private sector counterparts, public
sector labor was in short supply, and large groups of public sector
workers had begun collectively demanding improved conditions at
work.121 From the outset, public sector labor leaders understood that
political mobilization of their membership and communities was of
central import to their ability to win union recognition and to bargain
effectively.122 In response to this mobilization, in 1958, Robert
Wagner, the mayor of New York, and then in 1962, President Kennedy, issued executive orders legalizing public employee collective
bargaining—and public sector unionism grew rapidly across the country
over the next several decades.123 Teacher unions, in particular, found
themselves at the heart of political ﬁghts about racial identity, distribution of resources, and school control.124
In short, politics have always been inextricably connected to the
work of the labor movement in the private and public sectors. When
the AFL-CIO ﬁled its brief in Street, the railway labor case that was
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Lichtenstein, State of the Union at 114 – 40 (cited in note 115).
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Jake Rosenfeld, What Unions No Longer Do 159–81 (Harvard, 2014); Benjamin I. Sachs,
The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 Yale L J 148, 152, 168–71
(2013); Lichtenstein, State of the Union at 185–86 (cited in note 115).
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Joseph E. Slater, Public Workers, Government Employee Unions, the Law, and the State,
1900–1962 193–94 (Cornell, 2016); Lichtenstein, State of the Union at 181–82 (cited in note
115).
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Lichtenstein, State of the Union at 182–83 (cited in note 115).
123
Id; Slater, Public Workers at 193–94 (cited in note 121). See also Slater, Public Workers at
158–92 (detailing enactment of Wisconsin public sector labor law).
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Marjorie Murphy, Blackboard Unions: The AFT and the NEA, 1900–1980 (Cornell, 1990);
see also Leon Fink and Brian Greenberg, Upheaval in the Quiet Zone: 1199SEIU and the
Politics of Health Care Unionism (Illinois, 2d ed 2009) (describing politics and organizing
successes of insurgent health care union); Janus, 138 S Ct at 2475–76.
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the precursor to Abood, it offered the following encapsulation of the
relationship between unions and politics:
A look at the history of union political action supplies abundant proof that
labor’s interest in politics is as old as its interest in the closed shop or the
union shop. It provides full documentary support for legal commentators
who have concluded that “political activity is a legitimate if not indispensable means of advancing the cause of organized labor”; that “political
activities may be germane to collective bargaining insofar as favorable
legislation, or the defeat of unfavorable legislation, strengthen the union’s
bargaining position”; and that unions have an “inherent interest” in lending ﬁnancial support to certain political causes. In a word, even a brief survey of historical and economic data establishes that union political activity
is wholly germane to a union’s work in the realm of collective bargaining,
and thus a reasonable means to attaining the union’s proper object of advancing the economic interest of the worker.125

The brief continued with an elaboration of union politics beginning
in colonial times, and then marched through to the present, drawing
on historical sources as well as empirical studies, to show labor’s involvement in politics for every time period in American history.
Justice Frankfurter, in his Street dissent, underlined the point.
After detailing the labor movement’s achievements, ranging from the
eight-hour day to minimum wages, he wrote, “what is loosely called
political activity of American trade unions . . . [is] activity indissolubly
relating to the immediate economic and social concerns that are the
raison d’être of unions.”126 In an internal memo found in his papers,
which did not make it into the ﬁnal opinion, Frankfurter noted the
consistency between the American labor movement and that of the
United Kingdom, emphasizing the necessarily intertwined political
and economic role that unions play in any capitalist democracy.127 In
125
Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as
Amicus Curiae, Street, 367 US at ∗14 (US ﬁled March 21, 1960) (available on Westlaw at 1960
WL 98532) (citations omitted). Notably, the AFL offered this argument to counter a due
process claim; it saw no First Amendment problem for the reasons elaborated in Part III.A of
this essay, and therefore disposed of that issue quickly.
126

Street, 367 US at 800 (Frankfurter, J, dissenting).
Felix Frankfurter, microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library (“Felix Frankfurter Papers”) at Part II: Supreme Court of the United States Case Files of
Opinions and Memoranda: October Terms 1953–61, Reel 67, p 305 (“Reference to the English legislative history in dealing with the so-called political uses to which trade-union funds
may be put of course duly takes into account that England does not have our constitutional
problems. But trade unionism—its origins, its history, its development, its presuppositions and
purposes—does not have geographic bounds, and the response to law to it is not determined
by parochial considerations.”).
127
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the opinion, Frankfurter similarly drew attention to the fundamental
nature of worker organizations in capitalist, common-law democracies; he pointed to the political activity of British trade unions “as
early as 1867,” the Canadian Trades Congress in 1894, and recent
political activity by Australian unions:
That Britain, Canada and Australia have no explicit First Amendment is
beside the point. For one thing, the freedoms safeguarded in terms in the
First Amendment are deeply rooted and respected in the British tradition,
and are part of legal presuppositions in Canada and Australia. And in relation
to our immediate concern, the British Commonwealth experience establishes the pertinence of political means for realizing basic trade-union
interests.128

As Justice Frankfurter concluded, political efforts to improve the lot
of workers generally are, or should be, “as organic, as inured a part of
the philosophy and practice of . . . unions as their immediate breadand-butter concerns.”129
The Abood line of cases thus fundamentally misconstrued the role
of unions and their relationship to politics, and more broadly the
relationship of politics to the economy. The cases also misdeﬁned
the public’s interest in labor relations and the nature of the “public
square.” That is, to sustain the fair-share compromise without reducing fees to a paltry amount, the cases adopted a crabbed deﬁnition
of “public concern.” The doctrine excluded from its deﬁnition of
public concern what Justice Kagan in Harris termed the “prosaic stuff
of collective bargaining.”130 But workers’ wages are neither prosaic
nor of only private concern. They are at the heart of how our society
distributes economic resources. Again, Justice Frankfurter made this
point in dissent in Street years ago.131
Ironically, it is now the NRTWC and the Janus majority who argue that Abood misdeﬁnes the nature of economic disputes between
employers and employees. The wages and beneﬁts of public sector
workers, Alito pointed out, are clearly important to taxpayers and

128

Street, 367 US at 812–13.
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Id at 801 (Frankfurter, J, dissenting). See also id at 812 (“For us to hold that these
defendant unions may not expend their moneys for political and legislative purposes would be
completely to ignore the long history of union conduct and its pervasive acceptance in our
political life. American labor’s initial role in shaping legislation dates back 130 years.”).
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Harris, 134 S Ct at 2655 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
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citizens.132 Kagan did not contest that employment-related speech
has public import, but she countered: “The question is not, as the
majority seems to think, whether the public is, or should be, interested in a government employee’s speech. Instead, the question is
whether that speech is about and directed to the workplace—as contrasted with the broader public square.”133
Yet speech about and directed to the workplace is also often simultaneously about and directed to the “public square.”134 After all,
the wages and beneﬁts of both public and private sector workers are
critical matters for public debate. Recent teacher strikes taking aim at
chronic underfunding of education provide a vivid illustration of the
connection between matters germane to collective bargaining and
matters central to the public square.135 So does the Fight for $15, the
remarkably successful union-led campaign to raise the minimum
wage in cities and states across the nation.136 Indeed, in interpreting
the NLRA, the Court has recognized that private sector workers’
concerted activity regarding employment issues deserves protection
whether it occurs through the employee-employer relationship or in
the public square.137
In short, Abood and the Janus dissent operate according to a ﬁction
that politics can be separated from economics, while embracing the
view that unions’ primary function is or should be to resolve discrete
workplace disputes.138 The problem is not merely that this logic is
unpersuasive as a descriptive matter. The mistake also fatally infected
the rule Abood adopted about the permissibility of union fees. The
Janus majority exploited the weakness of the public/private dichotomy for the position that no union fees in the public sector are constitutional. The dissenters might have argued the inverse: union fees

132

138 S Ct at 2474–76.

133

Janus, 138 S Ct at 2495 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
Kagan differentiated speech directed to the workplace from speech directed only to the
public square on the ground that public-square speech does not implicate management
interests in labor peace and workplace control. For a critique of this point, see Part III.C.
135
See Kate Andrias, Feller Memorial Labor Law Lecture, Peril and Possibility: On Strikes,
Rights, and Legal Change in the Era of Trump, Berkeley J Empl & Labor L (forthcoming 2019)
(on ﬁle with author).
136
Andrias, 126 Yale L J (cited in note 9).
134
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Eastex, Inc. v NLRB, 437 US 556 (1978).

Compare with Street, 367 US at 814 (Frankfurter, J, dissenting) (“The notion that
economic and political concerns are separable is pre-Victorian.”).
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are constitutional, including those spent on political activity about
labor-related issues, for such activities are germane to unions’ core
function.139
c
While embracing an overly narrow conception of both unions and
the public’s concern, Abood also adopted too restrictive a view of the
government’s interest in facilitating unions. With the union framed
as an apolitical, workplace problem solver, the Court deﬁned the government’s interest in unions as achieving “peaceful labor relations”
and “labor stability” with its own employees.140 In her Janus dissent,
Kagan elaborated this theory. She detailed how mandatory agency
fees promote managerial prerogative: ﬁrst, she explained, exclusive
representation arrangements beneﬁt “government entities because
they can facilitate stable labor relations” by eliminating “the potential
for inter-union conﬂict and streamlin[ing] the process of negotiating
terms of employment.”141 Second, “the government may be unable to
avail itself of those beneﬁts unless the single union has a secure source
of funding . . . if the union doesn’t have enough [money], it can’t be
an effective employee representative and bargaining partner. And
third, agency fees are often needed to ensure such stable funding.
That is because without those fees, employees have every incentive to
free ride on the union dues paid by others.”142
But the government’s interest in facilitating well-funded exclusive
bargaining representatives in order to promote industrial peace is
dangerously thin ground on which to justify the compulsion of political
speech. As Alito pointed out, industrial peace and management prerogative can just as well be achieved, and largely have been, through
other methods.143 Moreover, labor peace and managerial efﬁciency
were not the sole or even the primary motivations for the enactment of
139
This distinction would track the line drawn in Eastex, Inc., 437 US, in interpreting
section 7 of the NLRA. One might imagine other sensible distinctions, for example, carving
out partisan candidate endorsements and contributions from chargeable expenses. The point
is that the distinctions would ﬂow from a more realist accounting of the role of unions in
society, and would reﬂect a different judgment about the relative costs of the contested action
to union objectors.
140
141

Janus, 138 S Ct at 2489 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
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modern labor laws—nor for labor’s insistence on the “union shop” and
mandatory fees. As scholars have documented, democratic and egalitarian aspirations better explain the labor statutes enacted in the New
Deal and in later decades. Supporters of the NLRA and the subsequent
labor and employment statutes governing both private and public
sector workers sought both to increase workers’ economic power and
to give workers greater voice on the shop ﬂoor and in the broader
democracy.144 The labor statutes were a means toward equal citizenship and social equality.145 And the closed-shop tradition was part and
parcel of this effort.146
Theorists of social equality have long recognized the workplace
as a key location for egalitarian struggle and for the shaping of democracy.147 Michael Walzer warns that inequality at work can “corrupt the distributive spheres with which it overlaps, carrying poverty
into the sphere of money, degradation into the sphere of honor, weakness and resignation into the sphere of power.”148 Elizabeth Anderson details how employers exercise extraordinary authority over their
employees’ lives at work and even beyond work, leaving them with
little privacy and freedom.149 John Dewey argued that the workplace
is a central location in our society for the development and exercise
of citizenship and democracy.150 Unions have, since their inception,

144
See Andrias, 128 Yale L J (cited in note 116); Forbath, 98 Mich L Rev (cited in note 113);
Pope, 106 Yale L J (cited in note 72); Barenberg, 106 Harv L Rev (cited in note 118). The
effort to equalize power provoked massive resistance by employers and was ultimately curtailed
by Court interpretation and statutory amendment. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 Minn L
Rev 265 (1978); Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47 Cath U L Rev 763
(1998).
145
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 Mich L Rev 225 (2013);
Forbath, 98 Mich L Rev (cited in note 113).
146
Lichtenstein, State of the Union at 68 (cited in note 115). Exclusive representation is not
the only way to create strong unions. See Rogers, 37 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L at 46–51
(cited in note 86) (explaining how European labor systems take wages out of competition and
achieve greater economic equality and workplace democracy through methods other than
compulsory dues).
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Bagenstos, 112 Mich L Rev at 243 (cited in note 145).
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 183 (Basic Books,
1983).
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Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We
Don’t Talk About It) (Princeton, 2017); Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?,
109 Ethics 287, 289 (1999).
150
See John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 118–21, 125 (1954); John Dewey, Liberalism
and Social Action, in Jo Ann Boydston, ed, 11 The Later Works, 1925–1953 25 (1987). For a
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sought to rectify the imbalances of power at work and to engage
workers in the practice of democracy, both in their workplaces and in
government.151
Today, in an era of staggering inequality, unions still function to
increase the power of workers in the economy and the democracy,
albeit with less success than in the post–New Deal period.152 Indeed,
Justice Kennedy observed at oral argument that what was fundamentally at stake in Janus was worker power in politics. He pressed
the union’s lawyer to acknowledge that “if you do not prevail in this
case, the unions will have less political inﬂuence.” The attorney conceded the point.153 Though Kennedy offered this argument as a reason
why union fees were unconstitutional, Kagan might have offered the
opposite perspective, invoking the signiﬁcant interest the government
has in facilitating workers’ collective voice in the democracy as a justiﬁcation for exclusive representation and union fees.154
Yet democratic and egalitarian aspirations—or countervailing
speech interests—nowhere appear in Abood or Justice Kagan’s Janus
dissent.155 Rather, Kagan’s focus is quite the opposite: she emphasizes
modern argument about the relationship of work to citizenship, see Cynthia Estlund,
Working Together: How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a Diverse Democracy (Oxford, 2003).
151
See Andrias, 128 Yale L J (cited in note 116); Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative
Commonwealth (cited in note 113); Rosenfeld, What Unions No Longer Do (cited in note 120);
Forbath, 98 Mich L Rev (cited in note 113).
152
See Rosenfeld, What Unions No Longer Do at 10–30 (cited in note 120). Compare with
Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (Basic Books, 1984) (describing, as of the mid-1980s, the role of trade unions in the United States). On the relationship between unions and equality, see, e.g., Bruce Western and Jake Rosenfeld, Unions,
Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 Am Soc Rev 513, 513 (2011); see also Henry S.
Farber et al, Unions and Inequality Over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data,
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 24587 (May 2018), http://
tuvalu.santafe.edu/~snaidu/papers/union_sub3.pdf (ﬁnding that “unions have . . . a signiﬁcant, equalizing effect on the income distribution”); Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson,
Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the
Middle Class 142 (Simon & Schuster 2010); Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and
Henry E. Brady, The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of
American Democracy 325–26 (Princeton, 2012).
153
Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Janus, 138 S Ct 2448. For a different take on this
exchange, see Purdy, 118 Colum L Rev at 2182 (cited in note 59).
154
This approach would not have persuaded the majority but would have put the dissent on
stronger footing both descriptively and normatively. Notably, Kagan has offered similar
arguments in her campaign ﬁnance dissents. See Arizona Free Enter Club’s Freedom Club PAC
v Bennett, 564 US 721, 756 (2011) (“The program does not discriminate against any candidate
or point of view, and it does not restrict any person’s ability to speak. In fact, by providing
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the need to give the government a “free[] hand” in dealing with its
employees,156 underlining the cases’ “attitude . . . of respect—even
solicitude—for the government’s prerogatives as an employer. So
long as the government is acting as an employer—rather than exploiting the employment relationship for other ends—it has a wide
berth, comparable to that of a private employer.”157 Indeed, to support her position in Janus, Kagan defended the focus on management
prerogative as the relevant governmental interest in the area of public
employee speech more generally.158 But, as scholars have shown, the
public employee speech doctrine systematically underprotects employee speech interests and the broader interest in social equality, for
it nearly always permits the government, as manager, to discipline
employees for speech made in the context of their employment.159
Like the Abood doctrine, the public employee speech doctrine places
employment not within the domain of governance in which the usual
principles of free speech apply, but within the domain of management subject to norms of managerial control and efﬁciency.160 In the
end, for those committed to a more egalitarian democracy, the doctrine is hard to reconcile with Kagan’s allusion to a First Amendment
meant “for better things.”
IV
The Abood doctrine is long-standing and the Janus dissenters
had reason to emphasize stare decisis rather than to challenge longstanding precedent. And unions did not seek Abood’s reversal. But the
liberal compromise struck in the 1950s over Frankfurter’s dissent,
extended by Abood and defended by the Janus dissenters, helped lay
the groundwork for the weaponized First Amendment. The Abood

156
Janus, 138 S Ct at 2492 (Kagan, J, dissenting), quoting NASA v Nelson, 562 US 134, 148
(2011).
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Id at 2493.
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(2008); Bagenstos, 112 Mich L Rev at 265 (cited in note 145). Because of the state-action
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Bagenstos, 112 Mich L Rev at 254 –62 (cited in note 145); Anderson, Private Government
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doctrine ﬁrst found a categorical speech harm where, at most, a
minimal infringement existed. It then went on to adopt an untenable
account of the relationship between politics and economics and,
more speciﬁcally, a cramped deﬁnition of both the union role and the
nature of the “public square.” Consistent with this approach, Abood
privileged the government’s managerial interests over its egalitarian
and democratic functions and took a narrow, one-sided view of the
speech interests at stake. Ultimately, Abood’s approach vindicated the
“right to exit”—the right of dissenters to opt out of the collective,
even when guaranteed the right to fair representation and the right to
exercise voice through democratic processes.161
The roots of union exit rights are in part liberal and egalitarian. In
the 1940s–1960s, African-American workers and civil rights litigators
rightfully opposed exclusionary unions, and their interests sometimes
overlapped with the goals of the NRTWC.162 But vindicating the
right to participate on an equal basis need not have resulted in constitutionalizing a right to exit. By defending this path, by attempting
to prop up Abood rather than to rethink it, the Court’s more liberal
members accepted the core of a doctrine that now threatens to eviscerate civil society and fortify corporate power.
Looking to the future, how much further the conservative majority
on the Supreme Court will go in weaponizing the First Amendment
is unclear. Janus raises the possibility that exclusive representation
could itself be deemed unconstitutional, further unraveling the U.S.
labor law regime. After all, if compelled union fees in the public
sector constitute an incurable First Amendment harm, why doesn’t
compelling a dissenter to be bound by the agreement of a union with
which it disagrees? Indeed, in Janus, Alito characterized the state’s
requirement that a union serve as an exclusive bargaining agent for its
employees as “a signiﬁcant impingement on associational freedoms
that would not be tolerated in other contexts.”163 Thus far lower
courts have declined to read Janus so broadly164—and the position of
the conservative majority on this question is unclear. The Janus
161
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Court did not expressly draw into question Minnesota State Board for
Community Colleges v Knight, which upheld exclusive representation
against First Amendment challenge.165 Rather, Janus spent several
pages making clear that the argument that “designation of a union as
exclusive representative of all employees in a unit and the exaction of
agency fees are [not] inextricably linked.”166
Also unclear is whether Janus will undermine the government’s
own ability to fund speech with which taxpayers disagree: for example, will the line separating the public ﬁnancing scheme for elections in Buckley from the agency-fee scheme of Janus hold? In a case
pending before the Washington Supreme Court, the Paciﬁc Legal
Foundation (PLF) points to Janus to support its challenge to an electoral public ﬁnancing scheme. The PLF asserts that Seattle’s Democracy Voucher Program “compels property owners to bankroll
speech they do not wish to support,” and that it “disfavors minority
viewpoints” by distributing money “at the whim of majoritarian interests.”167 In the immediate term, it seems unlikely that those Justices
concerned about the Court’s institutional legitimacy will extend Janus
so far—but the ground is laid.168
Another open question is whether Janus’s newly manufactured
opt-in rule will give rise to a far-reaching presumption of exit from
the body politic. Under the doctrine to date, opt-out is the rule: a
student who wishes not to recite the Pledge of Allegiance is protected
from expulsion, but the school need not afﬁrmatively seek permission
from every student or parent before recitation of the pledge.169 A
Jehovah’s Witness who obscures the state’s motto on a license plate is
shielded from criminal prosecution, but the state need not afﬁrmatively seek consent from every driver before distributing the standard
plate.170 In Janus, Alito turned the doctrine on its head, holding that
workers need not object to union dues; rather, their dissent will be
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presumed and fees will only be collected if workers afﬁrmatively consent.171 If such logic were extended, a host of majoritarian decisions
and governmental regulations would not apply until regulated entities
opt in. But this result seems unlikely. The government simply could
not function if it were routinely required to obtain consent from each
individual and corporation affected by a regulation. Here, it seems
the Janus majority was willing to distort the traditional approach to
compelled speech in order to weaken unions in particular.
In other ways, the reach of Janus as a “weapon” is more evident. As
Kagan notes in her dissent, and Alito does not refute, the Court had
repeatedly relied upon the Abood line of cases to approve mandatory
fees imposed on state bar members.172 In 1961, in Lathrop v Donohue,173 the Court treated the constitutionality of bar dues as having
been settled in 1956 by Hanson. Then, in Keller v State Bar of California,174 the Court relied on Abood in setting the constitutional limits
on mandatory bar fees. Keller is now in doubt, with the Court having
granted, vacated, and remanded related cases.175 The consequences
reach beyond the profession of law. The same principle would bar the
government from compelling contributions to, and thereby facilitating the operation of, a host of other civic organizations. Frankfurter foresaw this result way back in Street. In an internal memo, he
warned his brethren that he would “eat his hat” if the Court’s opinion
did not lead to a similar ruling for union fees in the private sector
(which it did), for integrated state bars (which seems likely), and for
other collective bodies.176
More generally, Janus is unlikely to be the last case in which the
Court strikes down regulation on the ground that it requires individuals or corporations to subsidize messages with which they disagree. Conservative judges on the D.C. Circuit have used a similar
theory against numerous governmental regulations. For example,
171
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drawing on First Amendment principles, a panel of the D.C. Circuit
concluded that requiring an employer to inform workers of their legal
right to organize a union via an ofﬁcial posting violated the NLRA’s
statutory “free speech” provisions.177 Another panel concluded that a
Securities and Exchange Commission regulation violated the First
Amendment insofar as it required publicly traded companies to disclose whether their products contained minerals traceable to African
war conﬂicts.178 Yet another struck down a regulation mandating that
cigarette packages display textual warnings and graphic images regarding the health risks of smoking.179 To date, the D.C. Circuit
sitting en banc has rejected this fully weaponized version of the First
Amendment.180 But in the aftermath of Janus, employers are pressing
the argument again, arguing, for example, that their own free speech
rights are violated when employees are granted rights by the National
Labor Relations Act to wear union buttons at work; such buttons, the
argument runs, carry a message with which the employer disagrees.181
Janus suggests that at least several Justices on the Supreme Court may
sympathize with this claim.
V
What then is Janus’s more hopeful, future-looking face for
those committed to labor rights? Janus’s undoing of the compromise
177
National Association of Manufacturers v NLRB, 717 F3d 947 (DC Cir 2013) (concluding
that section 8(c) of the NLRA, which protects employers’ rights to express “any views, argument, or opinion” prohibited the agency from requiring employers to post a notice informing employees of their rights under their law), overruled by American Meat Institute v
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 760 F3d 18 (DC Cir 2014).
178
National Association of Manufacturers v SEC, 748 F3d 359, 373 (DC Cir 2014), adhered to
on reh’g, 800 F3d 518 (DC Cir 2015), and overruled by American Meat Institute v U.S.
Department of Agriculture, 760 F3d 18 (DC Cir 2014).
179
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v FDA, 696 F3d 1205, 1214 (DC Cir 2012), overruled by
American Meat Institute v U.S. Department of Agriculture, 760 F3d 18 (DC Cir 2014).
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the NLRA to wear buttons displaying union message). See also National Association of Manufacturers v Perez, 103 F Supp 3d 7, 17 (DDC 2015) (requiring an employer to post government speech about labor rights is simply not compelled speech in violation of the First
Amendment).
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No 18-340 (Sept 14, 2018) (petitioning for certiorari from Fifth Circuit decision that company violated federal labor law by barring an employee from wearing a “Fight for $15” button
on his work uniform and citing Janus to support First Amendment argument).

2]

JANUS’S TWO FACES

53

that governed union fees for nearly ﬁfty years is a blow to unions, but
it opens up space for innovation and reform. The Janus majority suggested that, in order to solve the free-rider problem created by the
decision, labor organizations could abandon majoritarian, exclusive
representation.182 They could accept a system in which they no longer
represent all workers in a given bargaining unit, offering their services
only to supporters. Some scholars have urged the same, with different
motivation; they argue that ending exclusive representation would
result in more militant and effective unions.183 A second possible path
forward, urged by other scholars and supported by some state legislators, would be for public employers to transmit money directly to
unions to support their exclusive representation function.184 This approach would presumably solve the funding problem created by Janus. But neither alternative to worker-funded exclusive representation
has gained much traction with the labor movement.185 The ﬁrst approach, if pursued without other changes that protect labor rights,
risks weakening unions to the point where they might no longer be
able to pursue their basic redistributive mission, while the second
sacriﬁces the fundamental nature of unions as membership organizations governed by and for workers.186
Unions have instead responded to Janus by engaging in renewed
internal organizing, with workers explaining to one another why col182
138 S Ct at 2467–69 (observing that unions are not compelled to seek the designation of
exclusive representation and suggesting that unions could refuse to represent nonmembers in
grievance processing).
183
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lective organization should be supported.187 Some have been successful at maintaining and even growing their membership.188 A few
unions have also begun to develop campaigns not dependent on exclusive representation, campaigns designed to raise standards for workers throughout an industry, including nonunion workers, while shaping political debate on economic justice issues.189 Meanwhile, labor
leaders and scholars are engaging in a fundamental rethinking of labor
law, urging reforms that aim to increase worker power in the workplace, the economy, and the democracy.190 In short, Janus has accelerated a process of introspection and reconsideration, leaving labor’s
future far from decided but with signiﬁcant potential for renewal.
The undoing of the Abood compromise provides the opportunity
for a similar rethinking of First Amendment doctrine: what would a
more egalitarian and democratic First Amendment look like in the
area of union dues, labor, and beyond? This essay’s examination of
the errors of the Abood line of cases can help point the way forward.
Justice Harlan wrote to Justice Frankfurter at the end of the Street
deliberations: “Dear Felix, So much water is over the dam since
writing ﬁrst started in this case that your last circulation leads me to
say Amen again to your dissent. It is so right!”191 Harlan had a point.
187
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Frankfurter’s warning about the antidemocratic effects of expanding the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence was prescient. He
anticipated the creep of the compelled-speech doctrine, which became even more damaging to democratic governance with the subsequent growth of protection for commercial speech.192
Frankfurter’s deference to the majoritarian branches and reluctance to expand the category of absolutely protected speech beyond
its obvious core provide a starting point for imagining a better First
Amendment. Quoting Justice Cardozo, Frankfurter wrote,
[C]ountless claims of right can be discovered to have their source or their
operative limits in the provisions of a federal statute or in the Constitution
itself with its circumambient restrictions upon legislative power. To set
bounds to the pursuit, the courts have formulated the distinction between
controversies that are basic and those that are collateral, between disputes
that are necessary and those that are merely possible. We shall be lost in a
maze if we put that compass by.193

Adopting a minimalist and deferential approach would give government more room to pursue social democratic aims, including requirements for agency fees, without running afoul of the First Amendment.194 For those who believe in a more egalitarian political economy,
an approach requiring deference to the democratic branches ﬁnds
support in the empirical reality that courts have long been foes of
labor and redistributive legislation more generally.195
But minimalism, without more, could have signiﬁcant downsides,
leaving valuable expression and association activity unprotected.196
What of the rights to organize, bargain, boycott, and strike? An approach that primarily aims to minimize the First Amendment would
leave in place, and could even worsen, doctrine that allows signiﬁcant
repression of workers’ expressive activity by hostile legislatures—
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prohibitions on boycotts, pickets, strikes, and even the right of public
sector workers to bargain collectively.197
And there is an additional problem with a categorically minimalist
approach that merely aims to shrink the reach of the First Amendment. Such an approach fails to grapple with the widely held intuition
that the First Amendment is implicated when government restrains
or compels expressive activity that is not “core” speech. More generally, it fails to confront the cultural importance of the First Amendment and the Constitution—the First Amendment’s place in our
“small-c constitution”—the web of practices, institutions, norms, and
traditions that structure American society.198 In our constitutional
culture, the First Amendment has extraordinary power and resonance.199 Seeking merely to pull back the reach of the First Amendment without engaging in a debate about what it means to protect
freedom of speech and expression in our constitutional democracy
concedes the terrain of the Constitution.200
Understanding Abood’s errors allows us to imagine a substantively
different labor speech doctrine as well as one more procedurally deferential to democratic decision makers. In the case of agency fees,
imagine, for example, a doctrine that recognizes the minimal speech
harm to objecting workers, while embracing a more expansive view
of unions’ social function and government’s interest in regulation.
The doctrine would recognize that labor organizations serve a role
that is not limited to advancing managerial efﬁciency, nor to the
commercial sphere. Rather, unions enable workers’ effective participation in the political process, they facilitate worker voice, and they
serve as a critical countervailing force to organized business interests in
the public square. They also help achieve social equality. This version
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of the First Amendment would allow democratic processes to pursue
these interests at least when incursions on other speech rights are
minimal. Indeed, it would recognize these interests as essential to an
overall system of free speech, expression, and association.201
A doctrine revised along these lines would have implications for a
host of issues beyond the scope of this essay, including other aspects
of public employee speech and association, and even private employee speech doctrine. It might also draw into question such general
First Amendment principles as, for example, the requirement of state
action, the deﬁnition of rights in negative terms, and the law’s claim
to neutrality. Indeed, a doctrine valuing the speech interests of workers as a group or the government’s interest in social equality would
not be neutral. But it would be no less neutral than the system
adopted in Abood or in Janus, which put such considerations off limits,
weighing only the government’s managerial prerogative and interest
in labor peace, or only the speech interests of dissenting workers.
That there is a debate to be had about the social value of unions,
about permissible governmental interests, and about what it means to
protect the freedom of speech does not mean that the place for such
debate is primarily in the courts. Litigation is ill-equipped to drive
a more egalitarian First Amendment—or a more egalitarian labor
law.202 Instead, debate and struggle over the content of labor law and
the nature of “the freedom of speech” must occur ﬁrst and foremost
in the public square and in the political branches.203 But such political
201
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debate and political conﬂict will inevitably be in dialogue with the
Court’s own work.
Given our constitutional system, courts cannot avoid hard questions about social facts or socially constructed values. They inevitably
consider, either overtly or covertly, whether government is responding to a genuine problem, whether it is employing responsive instruments that are relatively nonburdensome to rights-holders or that
are in service of other rights.204 As Justice Frankfurter wrote in Street:
It disrespects the wise, hardheaded men who were the authors of our
Constitution and our Bill of Rights to conclude that their scheme of
government requires what the facts of life reject. . . . To say that labor
unions as such have nothing of value to contribute to that process (the
electoral process) and no vital or legitimate interest in it is to ignore the
obvious facts of political and economic life and of their increasing interrelationship in modern society.205

Ultimately, Janus’s destruction of the Abood compromise offers an
opportunity for the now-dissenters on the Court to rethink what, in
the context of the facts of our increasingly unequal political and
economic life, a “better” First Amendment regime might entail.

204
See Greene, 132 Harv L Rev at 63 (cited in note 106) (urging more explicit and extensive proportionality analysis in constitutional adjudication).
205

Street, 367 US at 815.

